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I. INTRODUCTION
A string of capital account crises in the 1990s and early 2000s attracted a lot of attention to the issue of excessive reliance of emerging market (EM) borrowers on foreign currency debt. Research in this area produced overwhelming evidence that currency mismatches (a situation in which foreign currency debt is not backed up by foreign currency assets) increase the likelihood and severity of financial distress. 2 The impact of the recent global financial crisis on some EMs has only confirmed the validity of these conclusions.
Why do EM sovereigns and their lenders settle on debt that seems to be crisis-prone? While academic research has provided many insights into the currency composition of external sovereign debt (i.e., debt issued in foreign jurisdictions), relatively few studies have investigated this issue in the context of domestic debt (i.e., debt issued in national jurisdictions).
3 This is despite the important role played by sovereign domestic debt in several EM crises (Mexico, 1994; Russia, 1998 and Brazil,1998) as well as the fact that in many countries domestic debt accounts for a larger part of public debt than external debt (Jeanne and Guscina, 2006) .
The focus on domestic sovereign debt has several advantages. First, it allows disentangling the location (jurisdiction) decisions from the currency of denomination decisions of EM sovereigns. 4 Second, the focus on domestic debt shifts attention from the foreign creditors' reluctance to lend in EM currencies to the EM sovereigns' incentives to borrow (and the domestic investors' incentives to save) in foreign currencies. Third, because cross-country heterogeneity in the currency composition of domestic sovereign debt is significantly higher than that of the internationally issued EM debt, the focus on domestic debt should allow a more accurate empirical identification of the determinants of its currency composition. Given the advantages mentioned above, the apparent scant attention devoted to the currency composition of domestic sovereign debt is likely to be due to the fact that the cross-country data on domestic public debt "remains curiously exotic" (as noted in Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008) . This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we develop a model where the optimal currency composition of domestic sovereign debt is an outcome of portfolio choices of households and the sovereign debt manager who takes the cyclical patterns of macroeconomic and policy variables as given. Second, focusing on the currency structure of domestic sovereign debt, we test the predictions of the model using a novel dataset on the structure of central government debt in 22 EM countries over 1980-2005 constructed by Jeanne and Guscina (2006) .
We show that when households and sovereign debt manager are risk averse and there is no risk of default, the equilibrium currency composition of sovereign debt will be tilted towards the instruments that represent a better hedge against the exchange rate, inflation and/or output shocks.
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The main predictions of the model are as follows:
 Countries where the real exchange rate is less volatile than the domestic inflation rate would have, on average, a more dollarized domestic sovereign debt. This is because both households and debt manager are risk averse and hence, dislike volatility in the yields on sovereign bonds. The households would prefer to hold more foreign currency bonds if the real exchange rate (which determines the return volatility of foreign currency bonds measured in units of local consumption basket) is less volatile than the domestic inflation rate (which determines the volatility of real return on local currency bonds). Same is true for the debt manager's incentives to issue such bonds, as she also dislikes the volatility of the real sovereign bond yields. 6 

In countries where the exchange rate is countercyclical (i.e., the exchange rate depreciates during recessions), a more procyclical fiscal policy (i.e., expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times) would lead, on average, to a more dollarized domestic sovereign debt. This is because both households and the sovereign debt manager care about the capacity of financial assets to provide a hedge against output shocks that affect the households' non-financial income and the sovereign's tax revenues (which, in turn, determine its debt servicing capacity). Foreign currency bonds represent a better hedge against output shocks when exchange rate is countercyclical. 7 A more procyclical fiscal policy increases the procyclicality of households' non-financial incomes and hence, their incentives to hold foreign currency bonds. In addition, we also show that when fiscal policy is highly procyclical, it creates perverse incentives for the debt manager to prefer to issue more foreign currency debt, reinforcing the foreign currency preferences of households.
While the link from more dollarized sovereign debt to more procyclical fiscal policy is well understood, few studies have looked at the two-way link between fiscal pro-cyclicality and the currency composition of sovereign debt. 8 Indeed, in countries where negative output shocks are associated with exchange rate depreciations, a higher share of sovereign dollar debt would tend to reinforce procyclical fiscal policy because the real debt burden of a more dollarized sovereign would rise by more in bad times. This paper shows that the converse may be true as well, i.e., when the exchange rate is countercyclical, procyclical fiscal policy may lead to a more dollarized sovereign debt.
The empirical predictions of the model are tested using a novel dataset on the currency composition of domestic sovereign debt in 22 EM countries over 1980-2005. The results of the empirical analysis support the model predictions and appear to be robust under a range of specifications and estimation methods. In particular, the empirical analysis confirms that countries with relatively high inflation uncertainty tend to have higher levels of dollarization of sovereign debt, and that in countries where the exchange rate is countercyclical, a more procyclical fiscal policy tends to be associated with more dollarized domestic sovereign debt.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II presents the key stylized facts on cyclical patterns in macroeconomic and policy variables in EMs. Section III introduces the model, Section IV presents the results of the empirical analysis, and Section V concludes the paper.
II. CYCLICAL PATTERNS IN MACROECONOMIC AN D POLICY VARIABLES IN EMS
The relationships between macroeconomic and policy variables assumed in this paper reflect the salient features of EM and developing economies, namely:  Nominal exchange rate changes and domestic price changes have positive covariance.

Nominal exchange rate depreciations (appreciations) tend to be associated with downturns (upturns) in economic activity -this phenomenon will henceforth be referred to as the exchange rate countercyclicality 9  Fiscal policies tend to be expansionary (contractionary) during the upturns (downturns) in economic activity -which will be referred to as fiscal procyclicality 10 .
There is an extensive literature documenting the phenomenon of fiscal procyclicality in EM and developing countries, as well as explaining its causes.
11 Riascos and Vegh (2003) , for example, argue that the incompleteness of financial markets in EMs could explain the procyclicality of fiscal policy as an outcome of a Ramsey problem. Lane and Tornell (1999) offer political economy explanation, namely the "voracity effect,"-in times of plenty fiscal resources are wasted and not saved for bad times. Alesina, et al (2006) explain this as an outcome of the political agency problem, where rational voters demand more public goods or fewer taxes in good times in order to reduce political rents, thereby, inducing a procyclical bias. More recently, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) present overwhelming evidence of fiscal policy procyclicality in developing countries by running a battery of tests on a dataset of 49 countries over the period 1960-2006. Moreover, the theoretical literature (e.g, Talvi and Vegh (2005) ) has shown that when fluctuations in the tax base are large (which is typical for developing countries and EMs), the government may find it optimal to run a procyclical fiscal policy.
12
This implies, among other things, that other economic agents would be taking the cyclical features of fiscal policy as exogenous when making portfolio decisions.
III. THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model of an economy that is subject to exogenous output shocks, as well as price and exchange rate uncertainty. We assume that households are the only potential buyers of financial assets and that government bonds are the only available financial assets.
There is no investment. The households' wealth is derived from two sources: output and financial asset holdings. The portfolio allocation decision of a household is thus driven by the financial diversification motive and by the need to hedge non-financial income against output shocks.
There is no default in the model. The government can issue two types of bonds: domestic currency denominated or foreign currency denominated bonds. The nominal interest rate in foreign currency, * r , is exogenous, while the nominal interest rate in domestic currency, * i , is determined by the domestic bond market clearing condition. In this model, the government's behavior is defined by fiscal rules that determine the amount of taxes and transfers as a function of output.
Taking these fiscal rules as given, the sovereign debt manager chooses the currency composition of sovereign debt in order to minimize the debt service cost as well as the variability of debt service costs across the states of nature. There are no principal-agent problems. All outstanding sovereign debt matures at the end of the second period and no new debt is issued.
The timeline of events is as follows: Period 1: Exogenous output shock is realized. Exchange rate and inflation shocks are observed. The domestic bond market equilibrium rate * i is determined. Sovereign debt is repaid and consumption takes place.
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A. Households
The objective of households is to smooth consumption across the states of nature. A representative household maximizes a standard mean-variance utility function, does not hold cash and is not allowed to short financial assets.
The nominal consumption t C in period t is assumed to be a geometric average of the tradable and non-tradable consumption, where  is the share of tradable consumption:
The aggregate price level in period t is given by: 14 This is consistent with the political economy interpretation of the procyclical fiscal policy by Alesina et al (2006) , i.e., when voters see a positive realization of the output shock, they demand immediate benefits in the form of either tax cuts or increases in public goods and transfers. 
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The nominal wealth of a household in period 1, 1 A , is given by:
where *  is a fraction of total wealth 0 A held in foreign currency bonds. The last two terms in
is a fraction of output transferred to the government, given the realization of an output shock.
The household's optimization problem is:
where 1 c and 1 a denote the real consumption and real wealth in period 1, respectively, and  is the coefficient of risk aversion.
Solving (4) under the assumption that shocks ŝ , ˆ, and p are small, yields the following optimal share of households' savings denominated in foreign currency
Financial portfolio hedging Non-financial income hedging Interest rate differential
where 1 y is the real output in period 1.
The interpretation of betas deserves special attention, as it is important for mapping the model into the data:
is the correlation between unexpected changes in the nominal exchange rate and the price level of tradables (exchange rate pass-through in the tradable sector);
V s is the correlation between unexpected changes in the nominal exchange rate and the price level of non-tradables (exchange rate pass-through in the non-tradable sector);
 is the correlation between unexpected changes in the exchange rate and output.
What is the intuition behind (5)?

As one would expect, the households' demand for foreign currency bonds is increasing in the interest rate differential between foreign currency bonds and local currency bonds (the first term in (5))
The financial portfolio hedging demand for foreign currency bonds (the second term in (5), which can also be referred to as the "minimum variance portfolio" (MVP)) is a weighted average of the pass-through of the nominal exchange rate changes to the domestic prices in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Given Assumption (1), the MVP term is always positive and tends to be higher in more open economies.
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It should be noted that MVP term can also be written as follows: The intuition is as follows. Since households are risk averse and care about the real value of consumption, they dislike uncertainty in the real returns on financial assets. Thus, the households would prefer to hold more foreign currency bonds if the real exchange rate (which determines the return volatility of foreign currency bonds measured in units of local consumption basket) is less volatile than the domestic price index (which determines the volatility of real return on local currency bonds). 17 Note that given our assumptions,
This expression is equivalent to the MVP term in the paper by Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) .

The non-financial income hedging demand for foreign currency bonds (the third term in (5)) is positive becauseˆ0    ,  >0 and 1   . Intuitively, because households' non-financial income is subject to a stationary random shock, households would like the return on their bond holdings to be higher in those states of nature in which their non-financial income is lower. Assuming that shocks to non-financial income are negatively (contemporaneously) correlated with the nominal exchange rate changes,ˆ0    , foreign currency bonds represent a better hedge against output shocks than domestic currency bonds because in bad states of nature, because foreign currency bonds yield a higher return (in local currency terms) than local currency bonds.
Taken together, both the financial portfolio hedging and non-financial income hedging motives would tend to increase the households' incentives to hold dollar bonds, with more procyclical fiscal policy (  >0) reinforcing such incentives.
B. Fiscal Policy and Sovereign Debt Management
The government follows a predetermined fiscal rule (described below). The sovereign debt manager has to choose the currency composition of sovereign debt, given the objectives specified by the government (also described below). There are no principal-agent problems.
The fiscal balance, 1 F , is equal to tax revenues minus transfers:
where  is the tax rate, 1 Y is output,  is a fiscal policy parameter.
The value of debt at the end of period 1 is
where t D is the nominal value of debt in period t (in local currency terms) and   is the share of debt denominated in foreign currency.
Because all outstanding debt has to be repaid at the end of period 1 and no new debt is issued, the government's budget constraint is as follows:
where 1 G can be thought of as some type of "fiscal buffer" that does not provide any direct utility to the households. Rearranging terms, we have the following expression:
We use the same price deflator as in the household's problem; and assume that the government has the same coefficient of risk-aversion,  , as the households'.
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The debt manager chooses a share of foreign currency debt to maximize the real value of the "fiscal buffer", while minimizing its variability:
; the initial level of debt stock and tax rate are given.
It is important to note that with pre-determined 0
 , the optimization problem (10) is equivalent to the problem of minimizing the expected real debt service cost, while ensuring that the debt service burden is lower (higher) in the states of nature in which the government's ability to service debt-as reflected in the value of tax revenues net of transfersis worse (better). These objectives do, in fact, bear a close resemblance to the typical operational objectives of sovereign debt managers. 20 Again, assuming that the shocksŝ , ˆ and p are small, the solution of the debt manager's optimization problem (10) yields the following optimal share of foreign currency denominated government debt:
It is sensible to assume a risk-averse approach to public debt management, since all the risk is at the end transferred to tax payers. For example, Wheeler (1997) suggests that the government's risk preferences should be aligned with those of a median voter.
What is the intuition behind (11)?  As expected, the supply of foreign currency bonds is decreasing in the interest rate differential between foreign currency and local currency bonds (the first term in (11)).

The financial portfolio hedging motive for issuing foreign currency debt (the second term in (11)) is the same as in the households' problem. For the debt manager, the portfolio hedging motives are similar to those of households, because he also dislikes the volatility of the real yield on government bonds.
The fiscal hedging motive for issuing foreign currency debt is represented by the last term in (11). Assume for now that 0   , then the last term reflects only the impact of the exchange rate countercyclicality on the debt manager's incentive to issue dollar debt. For 0   andˆ0    , the last term is negative. This means that foreign currency debt is more expensive for the government than local currency debt in bad states of nature, because the yield on foreign currency bonds (expressed in local currency terms) is higher than that the yield on local currency bonds. Thus, local currency debt is a better instrument to hedge against shocks to tax revenues than foreign currency debt.
In general, the government's state-contingent ability to pay depends on the value of  .
If 0   , the government follows a procyclical rule making a positive transfer to householdsˆY  given a positive realization ofˆ and a negative transferˆY  given a negative realization of ˆ. Consider different degrees of procyclicality:
   , the government's ability to pay appears to be worse when foreign currency debt is more expensive. Thus, for 0 1    , the last term in (11) is negative.
When  >1, the government's ability to pay appears to be better when foreign currency debt is more expensive, because when output shock is negative, fiscal policy is tightened to more than compensate for the shortfall in fiscal revenues due to the negative output shock, thus making more revenues available for debt repayments. The latter distorts the incentives of the debt manager in favor of issuing more foreign currency debt. Thus, for  >1, the last term in (11) is positive.
The bottom line is that while financial portfolio hedging increases the debt manager's incentives to issue dollar debt, the fiscal hedging motive would likely reduce the incentives to issue dollar debt unless fiscal procyclicality is extremely strong (  >1).
C. Equilibrium in the Domestic Bond Market
In equilibrium, the demand for dollar debt by the household sector should be equal to the supply of dollar debt by the government, i.e., 
Thus, in equilibrium, the currency composition of sovereign debt is determined by the hedging motives of the households and the sovereign debt manager. Thus, our model predicts that a country where exchange rate is countercyclical and fiscal policy is procyclical would have, on average, a more dollarized domestic sovereign debt. In particular, the non-financial income hedging term in (12) is positive because even for the range 0 1    (i.e., the range where households and the sovereign debt manager have opposite preferences regarding the currency denomination of debt stemming from fiscal and income hedging motives), it is dominated by the households' motive to hedge their nonfinancial income flow given that 1 2   (which is a plausible assumption in the context of EM countries). Moreover, the model suggests that all else equal, the share of dollar debt would be lower for countries with higher sovereign debt-to-output ratio.
Proposition: If the exchange rate is countercyclical (ˆ0
IV. TESTING THE EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL
A. Stylized Facts
What is known about domestic sovereign debt structures and their determinants? Previous empirical research found the dollarization of domestic sovereign debt to be linked to certain institutional and macroeconomic features of developing countries. For example, an empirical study by Mehl and Reynaud (2008) found the domestic "original sin" to be closely related to high inflation, high debt service-to-GDP ratio and narrow investor base. Using the same dataset as the one used in this paper, Guscina (2008) showed that domestic "original sin" decreases with the level of financial development, improvement in the quality of institutions, and achievement of macroeconomic stability. 

While both foreign currency and inflation-linked debt instruments are issued by EM sovereigns, the former appear to be more commonly used than the latter. As noted in Guscina (2008) , there seems to be a certain threshold level of inflation that induces government to issue CPI-indexed debt.
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B. Empirical Specification
In our benchmark estimation, the fraction of outstanding debt denominated in dollars is regressed on variables identified in equation (12) as the main determinants of the currency composition of domestic sovereign debt. These are given by: the financial portfolio hedging term referred to as the "minimum variance portfolio" (MVP); the fiscal procyclicality term (  ); the exchange rate countercyclicality term (ˆ   ); the debt to GDP ratio ( 0 1 d y ) 23 See Borensztein et al. (2004) .
24 Figure 3 at the end of the paper illustrates the relationship between sovereign debt dollarization and financial dollarization for 23 EMs.
25 Figure 4 shows the evolution of domestic sovereign debt structures in selected countries in Latin America and EM Europe.
capturing the size of domestic debt markets, as well as their interaction. Equation (12) can be rewritten as follows:
T NT
Fiscal
Exchange rate procyclicality countercyclicality
MVP Debt-to-GDP ratio
Dollarization d y ratio
where If we assume that taxation is constant over time, then the equation (13) we need to estimate can be re-written as follows:
Fiscal Procyclicality Exchange Rate Countercyclicality Dollarization MVP
Debt to GDP Ratio
Since this expression contains a triple interaction term (between fiscal procyclicality, exchange rate countercyclicality and an inverse of debt to GDP ratio), estimation results would be hard to interpret. They would also tell us little about the direct effect of exchange rate countercyclicality, fiscal procyclicality, and the debt-to-GDP ratio on the degree of sovereign domestic debt dollarization. In order to capture these direct effects, one has to derive a Taylor expansion of equation (13). Because the second order Taylor expansion would include a large number of second order derivatives and cross-derivatives and given that we have less than 400 observations, we limit the number of variables included in the regression to the minimum variance portfolio (MVP), exchange rate countercyclicality (E), fiscal procyclicality (F), debt-to-GDP ratio (D), and one interaction effect between exchange rate countercyclicality and fiscal procyclicality to avoid multicolinearity. This particular interaction term was chosen because we are interested in whether procyclicality of fiscal policy may lead to a more dollarized sovereign debt when the exchange rate is countercyclical.
The model that we estimate can then be written as follows:
where  is dollarization ratio, E is exchange rate countercyclicality, F is fiscal policy procylicality, and D is debt to GDP ratio, α s are coefficients or the regression and e is a normally distributed disturbance with zero mean and variance  2 .
The theoretical model predicts the following signs on the  coefficients:
α 1 >0: MVP should enter with a positive coefficient that is less than unity; α 2 >0: countercyclicality of the exchange rate is associated with higher dollarization; α 4 >0: this is the main prior of the paper. Procyclicality of fiscal policy should lead to higher dollarization in countries where the exchange rate is more countercyclical.
α 5 <0: higher debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with lower dollarization.
C. Estimation Technique
Because of the significant number of zero observations for the dollarization ratio in the sample, we employ a Tobit model to account for the limited dependent variable. Since the preferred specification includes the interaction term between countercyclicality of the exchange rate and the procyclicality of fiscal policy, one has to exercise caution in both estimating and interpreting the coefficient of the interaction term. We derived the correct marginal effect of the interaction term using calculus.
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The derivations of corrected coefficients in Tobit regression are in Appendix II.
D. Data and Variable Construction Dollarization ratio
The dollarization ratio is defined as the ratio of foreign-currency denominated or indexed debt (both tradable/securitized and loans) issued by central governments in domestic markets.
The Jeanne-Guscina EM Debt Database (2006) was used as the main source of sovereign debt data to construct the dependent variable (the share of foreign currency debt in total domestically issued debt). This database provides annual data on the structure of central government debt in 22 emerging markets observed over a period of 25 years.
Minimum Variance Portfolio
The "minimum variance portfolio" (MVP) is a weighted average of the pass-through of the nominal exchange rate changes to the domestic prices in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. It is computed as follows:
The consumer price index (CPI) and the nominal exchange rate (defined as local currency per US dollar) come from the IFS database. We compute the real exchange rate by dividing the nominal exchange rate by the CPI. Inflation on the CPI is computed as the quarterly rate of change in the CPI inflation (log differenced). Likewise, the growth rate of the real exchange rate is computed as the log difference with respect to the previous quarter.
Then, we compute variances of inflation and real exchange rate appreciation/depreciation over samples ranging from 1 to 20 years, as well as their covariance. In our estimation, we chose MVP based on 10-year sample period, named MVP10, because of relatively short series available for the Eastern European countries in the sample. For each country in the sample we computed MVP10 using the following formula, where variances and covariances are computed over a rolling 10-year period. 
Procyclicality of Fiscal Policy
Procyclicality of fiscal policy refers to higher government spending during good times, and cuts in government spending in bad times.
To construct this variable, we first require measures of real government consumption and real GDP. We take government consumption expenditure in local currency (from IFS) and divide it by the CPI to get real government consumption. The CPI and the real GDP in local currency are taken from the World Economic Outlook database (WEO). To get a measure of procyclicality of fiscal policy, we estimate the OLS coefficient of the growth rate of real government consumption on the growth rate of real GDP over a moving window of 15 years using annual data. The fiscal procyclicality term is positive for most countries/time periods, as expected (see Appendix Table 4 ).
Countercyclicality of the Exchange Rate
Countercyclicality of exchange rate refers to currency depreciation in bad times, and currency appreciation in good times, which is a common feature of EM economies.
To obtain the measure of exchange rate countercyclicality, we regress the nominal exchange rate growth on real GDP growth over a moving window of 15 years using annual data. Nominal exchange rate (local currency per US dollar) and real GDP data are taken from WEO. After obtaining the estimated beta coefficients from the OLS rolling regression, we multiply them by (-1). The exchange rate countercyclicality term is positive for most countries/time periods, as expected (see Appendix Table 3 ).
Size of Domestic Sovereign Debt Market
Domestically issued sovereign domestic debt-to-GDP ratio is a standard measure of the size of domestic debt market. It is taken from the Jeanne-Guscina EM Debt Database.
Other Controls
Other factors that we control for include institutional quality, the total size of the economy, and regional dummies.
Size of the Economy
The size of the domestic economy is proxied by the log of real GDP. While the size of the economy is not part of our theoretical model, we still choose to control for it, in the empirical analysis. This is because previous research found that larger countries are better able to overcome domestic original sin and borrow more in their own currency than smaller countries (see, for example, Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2007) ).
Institutional and Political Quality
We also control for the quality of political institutions using the Polity2 variable from Polity database (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Marshall and Jaggers 2002) , which captures the accountability and representativeness of the government.
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More representative political systems tend to have faster financial development, including the development of domestic debt market.
Hence, we control for political factors that might influence the development of domestic debt 28 . Our prior is that countries with better political institutions are more likely to borrow in local currency.
Regional Dummies
Finally, since Asian and Latin American countries differ significantly in the degree of sovereign debt dollarization, we include regional dummy variables to account for time invariant and unobserved factors driving regional differences in sovereign debt dollarization. Table 3 reports results for the Censored Tobit regressions on a pooled sample of 22 emerging market countries over the period of 1980-2005. The empirical results are broadly consistent with the model. First, the MVP variable has the expected positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Confirming our prediction, this result suggests that faced with relatively high price uncertainty, households will find it optimal to save a (possibly large) fraction of their total wealth in foreign currency to help smooth their income and consumption across states of nature. On the other hand, bond managers are likely to dollarize their debt, in an effort to denominate their liabilities in stable units of account and thus reduce the uncertainty of future outlays.
E. Main Results and Robustness Tests
Second, our empirical estimates validate the relationship between the dollarization of debt and countercyclicality of the exchange rate. When depreciations are linked to declines in income, the dollar's value rises in bad times, providing lenders with insurance services during recessions. Thus, investors (i.e., households) may skew their investments towards the dollar because it constitutes a safe haven from economic downturns. Third, the model's prediction that a higher debt-to-GDP ratio would lower the degree of dollarization is confirmed as well. This is consistent with the view that issuers face a tradeoff between getting access to less expensive capital via bonds issuance and avoiding potential currency mismatches. As the local market expands and the ability to issue in one's own currency improves, issuers tend to favor own currency liabilities over the foreign marketcurrency alternative. 29 28 For literature on the link between financial development and political regime see Rajan and Zingales (2003) , Perotti and Volpin (2007) , and Girma and Shortland (2005) . 29 There is another interpretation of the negative association between the government debt to GDP ratio and dollarization of sovereign debt. Because both high level of sovereign debt and high level of dollarization increase the risk of default, to the extent that the EM governments care about minimizing such risk they would try to avoid having both high government debt-to-GDP ratio and a large share of dollar debt. Fourth, our model suggests that the degree of procyclicality of fiscal policy by itself does not have an impact on the dollarization of sovereign debt, but that it affects debt dollarization through its interaction with exchange rate countercyclicality. We found strong empirical support for both predictions. First, the coefficient on fiscal policy procyclicality is not statistically significant. Second, the coefficient on the interaction term between fiscal procyclicality and exchange rate countercyclicality is positive and statistically significant. That is, the positive effect of the nominal exchange rate countercyclicality on the dollarization of government debt is amplified in cases where fiscal policy is procyclical. The effective parameter (or total effect) of exchange rate countercyclicality in the model (equal to 2
) is presented in Figure 5 .
Fifth, the empirical estimation also confirms that the fraction of bonds issued in foreign currency is significantly and negatively correlated with the size of the overall domestic debt market, which is also consistent with our model. Bigger economies are less subjected to both international and domestic "original sin", and more likely to borrow in their local currencies. These results are consistent with Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2007) , who found that bigger countries have larger domestic currency bond markets, and issue more debt in local currency. We also find that countries with better political institutions are more likely to borrow in local currency.
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This is consistent with findings of Mehl and Reynaud (2008) , Guscina (2008) , and others.
Robustness Checks
As learned from debt crises of the past decades, higher shares of dollarized debt have important implications for the probability and severity of crises. Highly dollarized debt structure might make a country more prone to both currency and debt crises, which in turn might lead to economic contractions and a cut in government spending. While the causality might go from degree of dollarization to procyclicality of fiscal policy, we believe that this direction would be more explicit during the times of currency crises. Thus, we first controlled for currency crises by including dummy variables for periods of turmoil in currency or debt markets, and second by limiting the sample to tranquil times. However, including currency crises or debt crisis dummies, or limiting the sample to only calm times, did not alter the results. We still find that procyclicality of fiscal policy reinforces incentives to dollarize dollar debt when exchange rate is countercyclical even in periods with no turmoil in currency markets.
We also investigated whether our results hold for a shorter, more recent period, where the quality of the data is likely to be better. Restricting the sample to 1987-2005 yielded very 30 The results are robust to using other measures of institutional quality such as ICRG index or the composite index of regulatory quality compiled by Kaufmann et al. (2005) . similar results. We also tried to address possible endogeneity issues by including one year lags of fiscal procyclicality and exchange rate countercyclicality (and their interaction) instead of contemporaneous values. The results still hold. The results of these robustness checks are summarized in Table 4 .
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper explores the link between exchange rate countercyclicality, fiscal procyclicality and the level of dollarization of domestic sovereign debt (i.e., debt issued in national jurisdictions) in emerging market countries. The empirical analysis is informed by the equilibrium model, in which the dollarization of sovereign debt arises as a result of the optimal portfolio choices by risk-averse investors and risk-averse sovereign debt managers. Consistent with the predictions of the model, the empirical analysis using the data for 22 EM countries over the period 1980-2005 confirms that  Countries where the real exchange rate is less volatile than the domestic inflation rate have, on average, a more dollarized domestic sovereign debt.

Countries where exchange rate is countercyclical (i.e., the exchange rate depreciates during recessions) have, on average, a more dollarized domestic sovereign debt.
Countries where exchange rate is countercyclical, a more procyclical fiscal policy (i.e., expansionary in booms and contractionary during busts) leads, on average, to a more dollarized domestic sovereign debt.
These findings have several implications for the discussion on the pre-conditions for developing local currency bond markets:  A combination of flexible exchange rate regime and inflation targeting would reduce the relative volatility of inflation to exchange rate changes and hence, the share of foreign currency denominated instruments in domestic debt markets.
If the exchange rate is highly countercyclical, reducing fiscal procyclicality may help countries the incentives to dollarize domestic sovereign debt.
Finally, we find that countries with smaller public debt-to-GDP ratios tend to have higher levels of foreign currency domestic sovereign debt. This finding appears to be line with the evidence that past debt de-dollarization processes have been associated with deepening of domestic markets (Bordo et al., 2005) , and that dollarization of sovereign debt is negatively related to the size of domestic financial markets (Claessens et al., 2007 , Eichengreen et al., 2003 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Foreign 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Source: Jeanne-Guscina EM Debt Database (2006) . 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 Source: Jeanne-Guscina EM Debt Database (2006). 
APPENDIX I. DERIVATIONS OF THEORETICAL EXPRESSIONS
A. The Household's Optimization Problem:
Consider the household's optimization problem. 
